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LEGISLATION
THE ROLE OF THE COMMON LAW IN INTERPRETATION
OF STATUTES IN MISSOURI
One of the fundamental principles of statutory construction is
that all legislation is to be considered in the light of the common
law. The reason for this rule is succinctly stated by Sutherland
as follows:
Where the language of the statute is subject to reasonable
doubt reference to common-law principles may provide a
valuable clue as to whether a particular situation is con-
trolled by the statute, and so all legislation must be inter-
preted in the light of the common law and scheme of juris-
prudence existing at the time of its enactment. The common
law, which has been moulded into a logical classification of
subject matter provides one of the most reliable backgrounds
upon which an analysis of the purpose and objectives of the
statute can be determined.1
Thus recourse to the common law is constantly being had when
the problem of applying a statute to a particular set of facts is
before the courts. In this respect, the decisions in Missouri con-
stitute no exception. 2
One of the most important functions of the common law in the
interpretation of statutes is its serving as a source of definition
of words used in a statute, particularly words of art, when the
statute does not supply its own definition. 3 An excellent example
of the rule that words undefined in the statute are to be inter-
preted and applied according to their common law meaning is
found in a recent case decided by the Missouri Supreme Court.
The statute in question provided that ". . . neither the injured
party nor any person of kin to him shall be a competent juror on
the trial . . ." , but the act did not indicate who was to be con-
sidered the injured party's kin. Therefore, the court employed
the common law rule, which provided that a prospective juror
1. 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 3 (3rd ed., Horack, 1943).
2. See, for example, Howlett v. State Soc. Sec. Comm., 347 Mo. 784, 149
S.W.2d 806 (1941) ; Johnson v. Fleutsch, 176 Mo. 452, 75 S.W. 1005 (1903).
3. 3 SUTHERLAND, op cit. supra note 1, at 9.
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was disqualified if related to either the injured party or the de-
fendant within the ninth degree of consanguinity or affinity.4
That such a procedure has the approval of the Missouri Gen-
eral Assembly is evidenced by the following statutory provision:
Words and phrases shall be taken in their plain or ordinary
and usual sense, but technical words and phrases having a
peculiar and appropriate meaning in law shall be understood
according to their technical import."
The above provision is a part of a section of the Missouri Revised
Statutes which attempts to solve some of the problems of defining
words contained in statutes in advance by specifically defining
particular words, the general statutory definition to be applied
unless ". . . otherwise specifically provided or unless plainly
repugnant to the intent of the legislature or to the context
thereof. '6 Thus, for example, this section provides that when
the word property is used it shall be taken to mean both real
and personal property.7 But the legislature can anticipate only
a few of such semantic problems in advance, and therefore, al-
though the difficulty of interpretation may be obviated in a slight
degree, the importance and usefulness of the rule that words
otherwise undefined should be construed according to their com-
mon law meaning remains largely undiminished in Missouri.
THE CANON THAT STATUTES IN DEROGATION OF THE COMMON
LAW SHOULD BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED
The most significant role of the common law, and the aspect
with which this note will be largely concerned is not, however,
one in which it functions as an aid in finding the true purpose
and meaning of the legislation but rather as merely a rule of con-
struction which, at least in the past, has served more to hinder
rather than aid in achieving satisfactory construction of statutes.
This hindering effect of the common law stems from the canon of
statutory construction that "statutes in derogation of the com-
mon law are to be strictly construed." The origins of this rule
of construction are not entirely clear," and it has been contended
4. State v. Thomas, 351 Mo. 804, 174 S.W.2d 337 (1943). See also Maltz
v. Jackoway-Katz Cap Co., 336 Mo. 1000, 82 S.W.2d 909 (1934); State
ex rel. Williams v. Purl, 228 Mo. 1, 128 S.W. 196 (1910).
5. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.090 (1949).
6. Mo. Ruv. STAT. § 1.020(1) (1949).
7. Mo. Ruv. STAT. § 1.020 (11) (1949).
8. See the following somewhat varying versions of the origin of the
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that originally the canon was not intended to have the very strin-
gent effect upon statutes that the courts later gave it. One writer,
for example, says:
In this abstract form, the maxim is hardly an accurate state-
ment of the law as laid down by the early decisions. An early
and more precise enunciation is found in a case arising as
long ago as the time of Queen Anne: 'Statutes are not pre-
sumed to make any alteration in the common law, further
or otherwise than the act does expressly declare.' 9
Regardless of the correctness of such contentions, however,
it is amply clear that the American courts, in the nineteenth cen-
tury particularly, adopted the rule in a much more emphatic and
vigorous form, namely, that a statute in derogation of the com-
mon law should be given a strict construction.0 As a matter of
practical application, this verbalization frequently meant that
the words of such statutes were to be twisted and tortured so as
to produce as little change in the existing law as possible.
It should be noted that this is not one of the conventional
intrinsic or extrinsic aids to interpretation (such as recourse
to the legislative history of the act), in which there is a true
seeking after the legislative intent, in accordance with the
"cardinal rule of construction,"" but rather that this is a rule
calling for a presumption on the part of the interpreter, a re-
quirement that he approach the legislation with hostility.12 Be-
canon: Bruncken, The Common Law and Statutes, 29 YA L. . 516, 519
(1919); Fordham and Leach, Interpretation of Statutes in Derogation of
the Common Law, 3 VAND. L. REv. 438, 440 (1950); Pound, The Common
Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. I. REv. 383, 387 (1908).
9. Bruncken, supra, note 8, at 519.
10. 3 SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note 1, at 164. A corollary or, as it is
frequently called, sub-canon of this rule is that statutes in derogation of
common or natural right are likewise to be strictly construed. It was most
frequently asserted where a statute was designed to interfere with long
vested property or contract rights, or a well-recognized personal freedom.
Its importance has, however, steadily declined.
The violation of a common or natural right was regarded in early
English and American jurisprudence as an 'extra-constitutional,'
ground for declaring a statute invalid, but in both countries the doc-
trine has quite generally been rejected. The rule that statutes in
derogation of common or natural right are to be strictly interpreted
is now generally recognized as being a component of the rule that
statutes in derogation of the common law are to be interpreted strictly.
Id. at 180. See also Fordham and Leach, supra note 8, at 446.
11. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE
LAw 46 (2d ed. 1911).
12. Fordham and Leach, supra note 8 at 439; Horack, The Disintegration
of Statutory Construction, 24 IND. L.J. 335, 342 (1949).
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cause it serves more to hinder than to aid in the accomplishment
of the legislative purpose, the canon has been repeatedly ad-
versely criticized.13 As has been frequently observed:
In a sense every statute, with the exception of declaratory
statutes, alters the common law-either directly or by enter-
ing fields previously free of common law regulation. Thus
all statutes potentially may be strictly construed because
they are in derogation of the common law. But to presume
that the legislature did not intend to change the common law
usually is directly contrary to the fact .... 14
The fact that the canon is of absolutely no assistance in finding
legislative intent has been the chief ground upon which its critics
have based their opposition. 5
It has been recognized that there is some justification (when
discriminatingly applied) for the sub-canon regarding statutes
in derogation of common right in England, which has no written
constitution, but it has simultaneously been pointed out that
there is no basis for even this sub-canon in the United States."0
Moreover, there are a few instances in which legal writers have
indicated that the canon, if understood in its milder form, to the
effect that if the legislature wishes to effect a change in the com-
mon law it must do so in clear terms, has some merit. Sutherland
states that it may be considered a useful method of securing
more certainty in statutory law by resolving doubts as to the
applicability of the statute against it.' He also states that it
may be helpful if used merely to bolster up an interpretation
arrived at on other grounds where the result avoids absurdity,
retroactivity or unconstitutionality or achieves the purpose of
the legislation,1 8 although why the result could not be placed
upon one of these specific grounds alone is not considered.
It is also pointed out that the canon is useful in restricting
13. For a particularly scathing denunication of the rule see Black, op. cit.
supra note 11, at 371. See also Fordham and Leach, supra note 8, at 438;
Freund, Interpretation of Statutes, 65 U. oF PA. L. RBV. 207, 216 (1917);
Pound, supra note 8, at 388.
14. Horack, supra note 12, at 344.
15. Either a statute does, or it does not alter the common law. Why,
then, a presumption either way? The assumption that it does either,
even before the statute is enacted, does not offer much help in finding
legislative intent.
3 SUTHMRLAND, op. cit. supra note 1, at 175.
16. Fordham and Leach, supra note 8, at 446; Pound, supra note 8, at 387.
17. 3 SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note 1, at 164.
18. Id. at 166.
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the effect of unwise, pressure-group legislation, when a judge
sincerely feels that it is out of harmony with the wishes of the
bulk of the people. 19 It would seem well to ask, however, whether
it is the proper function of the judge to enter such a political
area.
Aside from these few isolated instances of some merit in the
canon's being urged, it has, as is pointed out above, been quite
generally agreed by legal commentators that the canon is en-
tirely unsatisfactory and should be abolished. Most of the state
legislatures, seeing many of the purposes of their legislation
frustrated by the application of the doctrine, have likewise found
it something to be deprecated, and accordingly have attempted to
legislate it out of existence. The most recent information avail-
able indicates that forty-one states and three territories have
adopted statutory provisions designed to abrogate the maxim as
applied to all or a part of their legislation .2  Although Sutherland
is of the opinion that the statutes have for the most part sub-
stantially accomplished their objective,2 1 other writers are not
so sure that this legislation has been very effective.22
Missouri adopted such a provision in 1917. It was added as
an amendment to the statute, typical of provisions to be found
in many states, declaring that the common law and statutes of
Parliament in effect during the fourth year of the reign of James
the First should be the rule of decision in Missouri. Immediately
following this part of the section, the statute continues:
... but no act of the general assembly or law of the state
shall be held invalid, or limited in its scope or effect by the
courts of this state, for the reason that the same may be in
derogation of, or in conflict with, such common law, or with
the statutes or acts of parliament; but all such acts of the
19. Often when the phrase, 'statutes in derogation of the common law
are to be strictly construed,' is used, the court is seeking a convenient
way to make some policy of the common law which is reflected in basic
notions of the people still operative in spite of some special interest
legislation. This is the type of policy which would be reflected in the
case if it were left to the jury.
Phelps, Factors Influencing Judges in Interpreting Statutes, 3 VAND. L.
REv. 456, 463 (1950).
20. Fordham and Leach, supra note 8, at 449.
21. 3 SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note 1, at 177.
22. Fordham and Leach, supra note 8, at 449-452; Note, 12 U. OF PITT.
L. REv. 283 (1950) (a study of the effectiveness of the Pennsylvania pro-
vision abolishing the derogation canon).
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general assembly, or laws, shall be liberally construed, so as
to effectuate the true intent and meaning thereof.2 3
Therefore, it will largely be our purpose in this note to seek to,
determine with what success this provision has met in liberalizing
the treatment statutes in derogation of the common law have
received at the hands of the courts in Missouri. Before this may
be accomplished, however, it is necessary to investigate the-
treatment accorded such legislation in Missouri prior to 1917..
DECISIONS BEFORE THE 1917 ENACTMENT
In the period preceding the legislative attempt to abolish the,
derogation canon in Missouri, one encounters no difficulty in
finding cases which recited this rule of construction as a basis
for strictly construing the statute involved.24 Moreover, the doc-
trine concerning statutes in derogation of common right was
sometimes enunciated in this era.25
An example of the sort of construction to be found during
the period now under consideration, not only in Missouri but
probably almost every other jurisdiction, is contained in an 1885
case. A wrongful death statute before the Missouri Supreme
Court for interpretation provided:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrong-
ful act, neglect or default... such as would, if death had not
ensued, have entitled the injured party to maintain an action
and recover damages in respect thereof, then.., the person
who . . . would have been liable if death had not ensued,
shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding
the death of the person injured.2 6
The defendant in the case was a railroad which had wrongfully
received on board its train a fatally wounded man for transpor-
tation, thereby hastening his death. The court denied a recovery
to the man's widow on the ground that recovery was permitted
23. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.010 (1949).
24. Clark v. K.C., St. L. & C. Ry., 219 Mo. 524, 118 S.W. 40 (1909);
Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641 (1908) ; Thompson v. Union
Elevator Co., 77 Mo. 520 (1883) ; Gibbons v. Epperson, 40 Mo. 253 (1867) ;
Raper v. Lusk, 112 Mo. App. 378, 181 S.W. 1032 (1915); Cox v. Tipton,
18 Mo. App. 450 (1885).
25. There is no canon of construction more rigidly and universally
followed than that which requires statutes prescribing summary
remedies in derogation of common law and common rights to be
strictly or literally construed.
Judson v. Smith, 104 Mo. 61, 73, 15 S.W. 956, 959 (1890).
26. Mo. REv. STAT. § 2122 (1879).
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only against the one who caused the death and that the defendant
had done no more than hasten it. Although under the ordinary
principles of tort law, and even the more stringent requirements
of the criminal law, the defendant's conduct would have been
considered a "cause" of death, the court said this result was not
to be reached here because the statute was in derogation of the
common law.2 7 Thus we see what Mr. Justice Stone called "the
ancient shibboleth" 28 at work thwarting the obvious intent of the
authors of the legislation.
One of the early cases affirmed the doctrine of strict construc-
tion even though in doing so the court arrived at a result un-
favorable to the accused in a criminal case. Thus the court felt
that the derogation canon overrode the rule of construction that
criminal statutes are to be construed in favor of the accused.
The statute involved had set out a number of bases upon which
one could be convicted of a conspiracy. The defendant's act fell
within none of the categories named, but it did constitute a crime
at common law. In holding that the statute before them did not
operate to repeal the non-statutory law of conspiracy, a result
which might easily have been reached, the St. Louis Court of
Appeals said, "... the new law is treated as replacing the old
only in so far as it is directly and irreconcilably opposed thereto
in terms. 12
9
On the other hand, although the Missouri courts felt no hesi-
tancy about applying the derogation canon when they thought it
appropriate, they by no means applied it indiscriminately to
every statute conflicting with the common law that came before
them. There seems to have been no basic criterion for differen-
tiating between those cases in which the canon was applied and
those in which it was rejected, although a hazardous generaliza-
tion might be made that the Missouri courts were more likely to
apply the canon to a penal statute than one which was purely
remedial.
For example, the case of Rozelle v. Harmon30 involved con-
siderations very similar to the conspiracy case cited above, and
yet an opposite result was reached. In the Rozelle case, the issue
27. Jackson v. St. L., I.M. & S. Ry., 87 Mo. 422 (1885).
28. The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. REv. 4, 18 (1936).
29. State v. Dalton & Fay, 134 Mo. App. 517, 527, 114 S.W. 1132, 1136
(1908). Cf. Yost v. Union Pac. R.R., 245 Mo. 219, 149 S.W. 577 (1912).
30. 103 Mo. 339, 15 S.W. 432 (1891).
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was whether the Missouri statutes governing the administration
of estates operated to bar a suit against the defendant as an
executor de son tort. Clearly at common law such a suit would
have been possible, but the statute did not discuss such a situa-
tion. Nevertheless, the Missouri Supreme Court in this instance
held that the system of administration provided by statute was
intended to be the exclusive law on the subject, having impliedly
repealed any common law principles not mentioned in the statute.
To the argument of counsel that the statute was in derogation of
the common law and therefore should be strictly construed, the
court replied:
That rule of construction is not of universal application. It
depends much on the character of the law to be affected. In
cases of statutes, penal in character, or in derogation of
common right, a strict construction is required, but, in re-
gard to statutes merely remedial in character, a fair if not a
liberal, construction should be given. 31
As has been seen from the cases cited supra, such a rationaliza-
tion does not explain all the cases, however.
There are other cases decided prior to 1917 which also accorded
statutes quite clearly in derogation of the common law a liberal
treatment,32 and it would be very difficult to classify all the
statutes involved as purely remedial. It should be noted that in
those cases which did apply a liberal interpretation the court
paid at least lip-service to the "ancient shibboleth," but found
some reason for not being guided by it. Moreover, the instances
in which the court found the canon inapplicable are decidedly
fewer than those in which it accorded the statute conventional
treatment.
Interestingly enough, however, in one early case33 the St.
Louis Court of Appeals found itself speaking in terms directly
contrary to the rule of construction now under consideration.
In answering counsel's contention that because the statute was in
derogation of the common law, and that therefore it should be
construed so as to amount to no more than a restatement of the
law on the point prior to the statute, that court said:
31. Id. at 343, 15 S.W. at 432.
32. See, for example, Ex parte Welborn, 237 Mo. 297, 141 S.W. 31 (1911);
State v. Clinton, 67 Mo. 380 (1878).
33. Reed v. Goldneck, 112 Mo. App. 310, 86 S.W. 1194 (1905).
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... we must presume that the Legislature knew the law as it
existed, and sought to make some change by statutory in-
novation. We are to understand then, that the Legislature
intended to change the rules .... To hold that the above
statute did no more than reassert the common law on the
subject, would be equivalent to holding that its provisions
accomplish no purpose whatever. 4
Thus we see that there were some instances in the period
before 1917 in which the Missouri courts did deal with particular
statutes in a fairly liberal manner, but these instances were on
the whole isolated cases, and when the courts did depart from
the rule of strict construction they usually did so begrudgingly
and only after reaffirming their belief in the soundness of the
canon as a general proposition of law.35 Thus, this period may
be summarized as one in which the courts of Missouri were cer-
tainly on the whole committed to the derogation canon in name,
and in most instances followed it in fact, although there were a
few occasions when the courts deviated from this rule when other
considerations were deemed to be more significant. It is against
this background that the legislation of 1917 was projected into
the picture.
THE PERIOD AFTER 1917
The interpretation provision of 1917 by no means immediately
eliminated the derogation canon from the minds of the judges as
a factor to be considered in the construction of statutes. Several
cases decided in the courts of appeals flatly stated that since the
statutes before them were in derogation of the common law they
were to be strictly construed, without indicating that they were
at all cognizant of the 1917 act.36 And the Missouri Supreme
Court on one occasion very shortly after the passage of the act
recited the derogation canon, and although it alluded to the 1917
statute was ". . . of the opinion that the above act has no appli-
cation to the construction.. ." of the statute then before them.37
34. Id. at 313, 86 S.W. at 1105. See Thomas v. Maloney, 142 Mo. App.
193, 126 S.W. 522 (1910) where the court, obviously desirous of achieving a
liberal result and yet hesitant to denounce the derogation maxim, said that
although it was true that adoption was unknown to the common law, and
that statutes providing therefor must be strictly construed, ".... the rule
of strict construction is not extended to the act of adoption itself."
35. For a particularly good example of this attitude on the part of the
courts, see Wyckoff v. Southern Hotel Co., 24 Mo. App. 382 (1887).
36. Bostic v. Workman, 224 Mo. App. 645, 31 S.W.2d 218 (1930) ; Balter
& Miller v. Crum, 199 Mo. App. 380, 203 S.W. 506 (1918).
37. Taff v. Tallman, 277 Mo. 157, 166, 209 S.W. 868, 870 (1918).
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And there have been other instances after 1917 where the
Missouri Supreme Court applied a rather strict construction to
the statute involved. In these cases, however, the court has been
somewhat more discreet in its rationalization of the result. In-
stead of patently basing the result on the derogation rule, the
opinions have employed such language as: the fact that the rights
conferred and procedure established for their enforcement were
wholly creatures of statute made it necessary that the party
asserting such rights bring himself squarely within the statutory
requirements, 31 or merely that the statute was to be construed
in the light of the common law.39
Although it is thus evident that the 1917 statute did not by its
very enactment abolish the canon in Missouri, it should be noted
that those cases in which the Supreme Court continued to follow
the policy of construing statutes strictly were decided relatively
shortly after 1917, and that there remain only a few court of
appeals decisions to perpetuate traces of the canon in recent
years.4 0
On the other hand, most of the cases decided after 1917 which
have at all noted that the statute was in conflict with common law
principles have gone on to construe the statute liberally. Some of
these cases were decided shortly after passage of the 1917 statute.
For example, Turner v. Drees Hdw. & Furn. Co.,41 decided in
1920, expressly rejected a 1918 decision 42 which had said that
the Bulk Sales Act, being in derogation of the common law,
should be strictly construed. The court cited the 1917 statute
(apparently overlooked in the prior decision) as its reason for
the changed result.43
There are a number of cases decided after 1917 which indicate
that the Missouri courts have, for the most part, abandoned the
38. Betz v. K.C. South. Ry., 314 Mo. 390, 284 S.W. 455 (1926); Sarazin
v. Union R. R., 153 Mo. 479, 55 S.W. 92 (1919). See also Young Women's
Christ. Ass'n. v. Lapresto, 169 S.W.2d 78 (Mo. App. 1943).
39. State v. Wolfner, 318 Mo. 1068, 2 S.W.2d 589 (1928). See also Con-
tinental Bank Supply Co. v. International Brotherhood of Bookbinders, 239
Mo. App. 1247, 201 S.W.2d 531 (1947); State ex rel. Kenney v. Johnson,
229 Mo. App. 16, 68 S.W.2d 278 (1934).
40. Orrick v. Orrick, 233 S.W.2d 826 (Mo. App. 1950). See also notes
36, 38, 39 supra.
41. 207 Mo. App. 567, 227 S.W. 1085 (1920).
42. Balter v. Miller & Crum, 199 Mo. App. 380, 203 S.W. 506 (1918).
43. But see Rothenheber v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 262 S.W. 48 (Mo. App.
1924).
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canons both as to common law and common right as rules of
construction. In many instances where one of these maxins al-
most certainly would have been applied according to the con-
ventional thinking of the nineteenth century, the courts make
no mention of either the canon or the statute abolishing it, but
rather proceed to accord the statute before them a liberal inter-
pretation on some other ground.44
The most significant factor is that no very recent Missouri
Supreme Court decision enunciates the derogation canon or (so
far as can be discerned) applies it without specifically stating
that fact. On the contrary, the Missouri Supreme Court has
served notice that it no longer considers this rule of construction
of any consequence at all in Missouri, this statement having
been made in cases involving statutes traditionally subject to
strict interpretation because of their conflict with the common
law.'4 There have been no such recent emphatic announcements
from the courts of appeals, who as indicated, were chiefly re-
sponsible for the continuation of the canon after 1917, but they
too at times have displayed a quite liberal attitude toward legis-
lation clearly in derogation of the common law, 46 and it may be
expected that they will, at least on the whole, follow the pro-
nouncements of the Missouri Supreme Court.4 7 Thus it appears
that although a substantial period of time after 1917 was re-
quired for the Missouri courts to reach a position of cooperation
with the 1917 interpretation provision, that position has now
about been effected.
The problem involved in determining whether a statute should
be construed strictly is ordinarily one of whether the words of
the statute should be limited so as to restrict the language of the
44. Stamm Electric Co. v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., 350 Mo. 1178, 171
S.W.2d 580 (1943); Wentz v. Price Candy Co., 352 Mo. 1, 175 S.W.2d 852(1943); Robertson v. Jones, 345 Mo. 828, 136 S.W.2d 278 (1940); Cummins
v. K.C. Pub. Serv. Co., 334 Mo. 672, 66 S.W.2d 920 (1933) ; Hannibal Trust
Co. v. Elizea, 315 Mo. 485, 286 S.W. 371 (1926); Martin v. Claxton, 308
Mo. 314, 274 S.W. 77 (1925); Grier v. K.C., C.C. & St. J. R.R., 286 Mo.
523, 228 S.W. 454 (1921); McManus v. Park 287 Mo. 109, 229 S.W. 211(1921) ; Moore & Co. v. McConkey, 240 Mo. App. 198, 203 S.W.2d 512 (1947).
45. Cooper v. K.C. Pub. Serv., 356 Mo. 482, 202 S.W.2d 42 (1947)(wrongful death act); In re Duren 355 Mo. 1222, 200 S.W.2d 343 (1947)(adoption statute); Women's Christ. Ass'n. of K.C. v. Brown, 354 Mo.
700, 190 S.W.2d 900 (1945) (zoning ordinance).
46. Town of Carrollton ex rel. Barrie v. Thomas, 24 S.W.2d 218 (Mo.
App. 1930); Betz v. K.C. South. Ry., 253 S.W. 1089 (Mo. App. 1923).
47. See, however, Orrick v. Orrick, 233 S.W.2d 826 (Mo. App. 1950).
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statute itself on a specific point in order to effect as small a
change as possible in the common law previously existing on the
subject. As has been pointed out, the Missouri courts have in
recent years become quite liberal in this respect, despite the fact
that the derogation canon had, before 1917, gained a rather solid
foothold in Missouri.
An example of the problem as it normally arises and of the
manner in which the Missouri Supreme Court would dispose of
it today is to be found in Cape Girardeau v. Hunze.48 One of the
issues there involved was whether the tax paying citizens of a
municipality were disqualified as jurors in litigation involving
the municipality. It had been a well established rule at common
law that they were so disqualified. The Missouri Supreme Court
said:
A number of early decisions of this court recognized and
adhered to the common-law rule.... Since these early de-
cisions, the Legislature has enacted a statute . . which
provides: 'In all actions by or against any county or city,
the inhabitants of the county or city so suing or being sued
may be jurors if otherwise competent and qualified.' Ap-
pellants insist that the foregoing statute is in derogation of
the common law and hence must be strictly construed. The
Legislature, however, in 1917 . . . repealed our former
statute enacting the common law and enacted a new section
in lieu thereof .... 49
Thus in this sort of case, where one of the parties flagrantly
seeks to have the court limit the language of the statute in order
to thwart what is the quite obvious purpose of the legislature,
his contentions will be brushed aside with little hesitancy.
A somewhat more specific problem involved under the general
issue of whether the words of the statute are to be liberally or
strictly construed is that arising in the situation where there
existed at common law several distinct rights or causes of action
in a particular area of the law, and there was then enacted
legislation in this area which does not expressly deal with all
aspects of the problem. The issue is then how far the statute or
statutes involved "occupy the field." Do they impliedly repeal all
of the common law on the subject, or at least that part of the
common law which would clearly govern the factual situation
48. 314 Mo. 438, 284 S.W. 471 (1926).
49. Id. at 456, 284 S.W. at 476.
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before the court in the absence of the legislation? In the past,
this problem of statutory construction was one in which the
courts of most jurisdictions were quite wont to apply the deroga-
tion canon.50
In this limited area, the courts in Missouri, on the whole, ap-
pear even prior to 1917 to have approached the question with a
fairly open mind. They considered all the circumstances involved
and, although somewhat hesitantly, sometimes arrived at a de-
cision that the scope of the statute was such as to impliedly
change the common rules a good deal more than the actual word-
ing of the statute seemed to make absolutely necessary.51 On
the other hand, it could hardly be said that the Missouri courts
approached this legislation with a liberal attitude before 1917,
and just as often as not they found that the common law rights
and causes of action were not impliedly repealed, verbalizing this
result by means of the derogation canon.52
An example of the type of case now under consideration in-
volved a statute which abolished the common law defenses of
contributory negligence and assumption of the risk in negligence
actions by trainmen against their employers, and which imposed
a special two year statute of limitations on suits under the act.
The issue was whether this statute impliedly abolished the com-
mon law action of negligence for this class of employees when
they could show a cause of action under common law principles
alone and had not brought suit within two years after the injury
occurred. The Missouri Supreme Court in this instance held the
common law action of negligence still existent, attributing the
result in part to the fact that the statute was in derogation of the
common law.5- However, it appears from the opinion that the
statute played only a minor role in the determination of the case;
other factors rather clearly were the primary determinants of
the result.
In the period after 1917, there have been few cases involving
this particular sort of problem before the courts. This situation
is perhaps largely attributable to the fact that there are today
50. 3 SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note 1, at 164.
51. Rozelle v. Harmon, 103 Mo. 339, 15 S.W. 432 (1891); Wyckoff v.
Southern Hotel Co., 24 Mo. App. 382 (1887).
52. State v. Dalton & Fay, 134 Mo. App. 517, 114 S.W. 1132 (1908). Cf.
Raper v. Lusk, 192 Mo. App. 378, 181 S.W. 1032 (1915).
53. Yost v. Union Pac. R.R., 245 Mo. 219, 149 S.W. 577 (1912).
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relatively few areas of the law governed solely by common law
principles, so that most modern legislation does not enter areas
theretofore unregulated by statute. Of the few courts of appeals
opinions which have dealt with this problem since 1917, several
have displayed reluctance to find that the statute before them
impliedly repealed the common law on the subject," and one,
decided in 1930, flatly stated that it would not extend the statute
beyond its literal terms because it was in derogation of the com-
mon law.5 However, the Missouri Supreme Court has indicated
that it intends to construe such statutes liberally in accordance
with the purpose of the 1917 statute, even when such a course
involves a finding that a particular area of the law is now wholly
regulatzd by legislation. Thus the latest pronouncement of the
Missouri Supreme Court on this aspect of the subject indicates
that so far as it is concerned the ancient rule that statutes in
derogation of the common law should be strictly construed is no
longer of any consequence in Missouri."'
Perhaps the success of the 1917 interpretation provision can
best be illustrated by examining the treatment accorded several
types of statutes traditionally viewed as in derogation of the
common law after the 1917 act. The wrongful death act and the
statutes relating to adoption serve as the best examples.
The wrongful death statutes, being patently in derogation of
the common law, were accordingly under the older jurisprudence
quite strictly construed by the Missouri Supreme Court. 7 But
with one exception (in which the Supreme Court'8 overruled a
liberal interpretation by the Springfield Court of Appeals"9 ) the
wrongful death statutes in Missouri have been liberally inter-
preted since 1917.0
Similarly, in one of the latest cases construing an adoption
statute, a type of legislation also traditionally construed strictly
54. Continental Bank Supply Co. v. International Brotherhood of Book-
binders, 239 Mo. App. 1247, 201 S.W.2d 531 (1947) ; State ez rel. Kenney v.
Johnson, 229 Mo. App. 16, 68 S.W.2d 278 (1934).
55. Bostic v. Workman, 224 Mo. App. 645, 31 S.W.2d 218 (1930).
56. Robertson v. Jones, 345 Mo. 828, 136 S.W.2d 278 (1940).
57. Clark v. K.C., St. L. & C. Ry., 219 Mo. 524 118 S.W. 40 (1909);
Jackson v. St. L., I.M. & South. Ry., 87 Mo. 422 (1885).
58. Betz v. K.C. South. Ry., 314 Mo. 390, 284 S.W. 455 (1926).
59. Betz v. K.C. South. Ry., 253 S.W. 1089 (Mo. App. 1923).
60. Cooper v. K.C. Pub. Serv. Co., 356 Mo. 482, 202 S.W.2d 42 (1947);
Cummins v. K.C. Pub. Serv. Co., 334 Mo. 672, 66 S.W.2d 920 (1933); Grier
v. K.C., C.C. & St. J. Ry., 286 Mo. 523, 228 S.W. 454 (1921).
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at common law, the Supreme Court emphatically indicated that
it considered the derogation canon abolished in Missouri. The
court said:
[The Act of 1917] . . . forbids a construction of statutes
limiting their scope or effect merely because they are in
derogation of the common law. And aside from that, our
courts are not wedded to the doctrine of 'strict' and 'liberal'
construction of statutes. They seek to arrive at the intention
of the legislature as disclosed, in part at least, by the objec-
tives of the legislation.6 '
CONCLUSION
Although it is now clear that the Missouri Supreme Court has
divorced itself from the doctrine of strict construction of statutes
in derogation of the common law, 2 it is not so clear that it has
yet achieved the very liberal attitude which Dean Pound had in
mind when he said:
Strict or liberal construction of statutes is by no means the
whole question. Even when statutes are not avowedly given
a strict construction, as being in derogation of the common
law, courts refuse to treat the rules established by legislation
as parts of the law. They are conceded to be applicable to
certain cases because the legislature clearly said so, but they
are not conceived of as entering into the legal system as an
organic whole. They are not regarded as coordinate with the
common law rules in pari materia.6 3
61. In re Duren, 355 Mo. 1222, 1235, 200 S.W.2d 343, 352 (1947). It
should also be noted that the workmen's compensation act has been con-
strued quite liberally in behalf of the workman by the courts. Wentz v.
Price Candy Co., 352 Mo. 1, 175 S.W.2d 852 (1943); Decker v. Raymond
Concrete Pile Co., 336 Mo. 1116, 82 S.W.2d 267 (1935) ; Maltz v. Jackoway-
Katz Cap Co., 336 Mo. 1000, 82 S.W.2d 909 (1934); Evarard v. Women's
Home Companion Reading Club, 235 Mo. App. 760, 122 S.W.2d 51 (1938) ;
Drecksmith v. Universal Carloading Co., 18 S.W.2d (Mo. App. 1929). How
great a part the specific statutory provision that the act be liberally con-
strued contained in the act has played is uncertain, but the same result
would probably have been achieved without it because practically all courts
have in recent years displayed a marked tendency to extend very liberally
social legislation "substituting modern and humane social duties" for the
rigorous rules of the common law. 3 SUTHERLAND, op. Cit. supra note 1, at
171.
62. It should be pointed out, however, that research for this note was
conducted upon a limited scale, being confined for the most part to instances
in which the courts have in their opinions noted the fact that the statute
involved was in derogation of the common law. Thus there may possibly
be a number of instances in which the courts have been influenced by the
factors underlying the derogation canon without indicating this in their
opinion.
63. Pound, supra note 8, at 386.
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There have, to be sure, been instances when the Missouri Su-
preme Court appeared to have been utilizing the Missouri stat-
utes as Dean Pound would have desired," but it appears that the
time when legislation achieves this status completely will not
arrive in the near future.
Nevertheless, the Missouri Supreme Court has, in the space of
about thirty-five years, achieved one great step forward by very
nearly eradicating the ancient canon that statutes in derogation
of the common law are to be strictly construed.
WARREN R. MAIcHEL
64. See Martin v. Claxton, 308 Mo. 314, 274 S.W. 77 (1925).
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